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Abstract
In developing countries, biodiversity is often threatened by the devel-
opment of agricultural production because natural habitats are destroyed
by the conversion of forests, wetlands or natural pastures into arable land.
There is a trade-o⁄ between revenues generated by agricultural produc-
tion and services supplied by unspoilt natural capital (ecological services,
possibility to develop biodiversity-related tourism activities). Whereas
agricultural pro￿ts are private, biodiversity produces various types of ben-
e￿ts, some of them have global public good characteristics ￿they bene￿t
all nations without exclusion and without rivalry￿ while others are re-
gional public inputs in the natural asset-based production activities of
neighbouring countries. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether
international income transfers can improve the global level of biodiver-
sity and global social welfare by changing the relative contributions to
biodiversity-protection and to agricultural production. Because of the
public good nature of biodiversity, Warr￿ s neutrality theorem suggests
that such transfers may have no e⁄ects at all (Warr, 1983). A simple
model is developed, based on the simplifying assumption that northern
countries have little biodiversity whereas southern countries are endowded
with natural capital in the form of unspoilt biodiversity-rich land. South-
ern countries allocate optimally land and capital to two competing produc-
tive activities, agriculture and eco-tourism. When transfers are organized
from the North to the South, we show that Warr￿ s neutrality theorem col-
lapses except under restrictive hypothesis concerning the characteristics
of the eco-tourism and agricultural production functions. We also demon-
strate that Pareto-improvements can be obtained even with reductions in
the level of biodiversity.
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1 Introduction
Biodiversity conservation produces bene￿ts which have a global public good
dimension: they are non rival and non excludable at the international level.
For example, the protection of the Amazonian forest contributes to mitigate
the e⁄ects of global warming. The conservation of traditional crop varieties
constitutes a useful gene pool in case of catastrophic crop failure associated
with a new pathogen. Countries have therefore engaged into coordinated poli-
cies in order to preserve biodiversity: the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) was signed by 150 government leaders at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.
Almost 15 years later, it is widely acknowledged that the impact of the CBD
on biodiversity is relatively limited, since it rests mostly on voluntary commit-
ments made by signatory parties, with neither reliable means of control nor
credible sanctions. The only interstate incentive mechanism is provided by the
Global Environmental Fund (GEF) which allocates grants to assist developing
countries and transition countries in adopting measures for the protection and
conservation of biodiversity. Such grants are conditional transfers: they are
calculated so as to compensate for the "agreed full incremental costs" (CBD,
Art.20(2)) and are paid on the condition that the recipient complies with a
certain behaviour or expected outcome. However the GEF not only has very
limited ￿nancial resources, but it is also plagued by ine⁄ectiveness and slowness
associated with huge control costs to monitor compliance of recipient countries
(Deke, 2004) . An alternative solution is to investigate more thoroughly the ef-
fectiveness of international redistributive policies - unconditional transfers - on
the global level of biodiversity and on global welfare. Although this is a question
which is regularly invoked in the debt-for-nature swap debate by environmental
and development non governmental organizations, theoretical contributions are
relatively scarce.
At ￿rst sight, this is explained by the fact that redistributive policies are
generally designed to achieve equity goals, rather than e¢ ciency or biodiversity
conservation. Nethertheless, they raise a number of important conceptual issues.
In a context of environmental externalities like biodiversity it is generally not
possible to separate out e¢ ciency and equity goals: the second welfare theorem
does not hold here, which means that lump sum transfers may have an e⁄ect
on social e¢ ciency. But would they modify behaviors in the right direction?
If so, they could be considered a simpler and less costly instrument, in terms
of transaction costs, that deserves further attention. Of course, the ambition
2would then be restricted to improving changes, rather than achieving a ￿rst best
outcome. But compared to more sophisticated incentive mechanisms, lump sum
transfers do not have to cope with informational obstacles, nor do they have
to deal with monitoring and compliance issues, since they are unconditional by
de￿nition. Those transfers exists anyway, and one may simply want to know,
beyond their e⁄ects on equity, what consequences they may have on biodiversity
and welfare.
Because of the public good nature of biodiversity, the theoretical literature
actually suggests that such transfers may have no e⁄ect at all, neither on the
level of biodiversity, nor on welfare. Indeed, Warr (1983) has demonstrated that
the private provision of a public good is una⁄ected by a marginal redistribution
of income between contributors, despite di⁄erences in their marginal propensi-
ties to contribute to the public good. In other words, an international policy
which would induce some higher-income countries to contribute to a multilateral
fund with the view to transfer revenues to lower-income countries would not en-
hance the supply of the global public good biodiversity. The reason is that donor
countries would then reduce their voluntary contribution to the public good to
the amount of their lost income and would rely instead on contributions made by
others. This "crowding out" phenomenon is known as the "neutrality" theorem:
redistributive policies amongst voluntary contributors are useless1. This result
only holds for a public good whose technology of production is purely additive:
each contribution to the public good adds identically and cumulatively to the
overall level of public good.
The impact of international transfers on global environmental issues has
been studied in the speci￿c context of consumption externalities by Ono (1998).
Following Buchholz and Konrad (1994), Ono shows that lump-sum transfers
between two types of countries, contributing industrial countries and non con-
tributing developing countries, can improve global environmental quality and
welfare. It is also shown, quite counterintuitively, that it might be Pareto-
improving - under certain conditions - to organize transfers from poor countries
to rich countries.
The objective of the paper is to revisit the Warr￿ s "neutrality" theorem
and Ono￿ s results when the public good under consideration is biodiversity.
A ￿rst challenge is to design a conceptual framework that captures important
speci￿c dimensions of the problem. From the many dimensions of biodiversity,
we single out three. We ￿rst argue that biodiversity generates in fact two types of
public bene￿ts: global bene￿ts associated with the option value of the gene pool
preserved; and regional bene￿ts associated with ecosystem services (amenities,
￿ ood protection by a wetland, reduction of erosion by a forest, etc.), which
have the characteristics of regional public goods shared by several neighbour
countries. We then de￿ne two types of countries: ecosystem-rich countries can
1Warr￿ s demonstration holds for marginal transfers between agents who remain contribu-
tors after the change. It has been extended in Bergstrom et al (1986) and Cornes and Sandler
(1985) who have been able to identify how large transfers can be before they change the set
of contributors and do have an e⁄ect. Itaya et al (1999) o⁄er an analysis of such large and
non neutral transfers.
3contribute to biodiversity conservation by preserving their natural ecosystems
instead of converting them for higher return activities; ecosystem-poor countries
cannot preserve biodiversity "at home" and cannot therefore enjoy the local
bene￿ts of biodiversity but they can contribute ￿nancially to improve the global
bene￿ts of biodiversity (i.e. by ￿nancing more research on biotechnologies and
creating more knowldege on the value of genetic resources). To sum-up, we
assume that biodiversity is both a global public good, which is an argument
of the utility function of all countries, and a local input, - when it is used
by ecosystem-rich countries in activities based on natural assets such as eco-
tourism.
The aggregation function of countries￿contributions to biodiversity conser-
vation is therefore more complex than in Warr￿ s generic model: the biodiversity
framework described here is a multiple inputs / multiple outputs technology, in-
stead of multiple inputs / single output process. Even if basic linearity assump-
tions are maintained2, as in Warr (1989), it is not clear whether the neutrality
theorem still holds.
In order to disentangle the role played by the above dimensions of biodi-
versity, we carry the analysis following a progressive sophistication approach.
Section 2 starts with a simple resource allocation problem, cast as a two input-
two output model. A southern country allocates optimally land and capital to
two productive activities, one induces a destruction of biodiversity, the other
one is based on its preservation. Let us say, to ￿x ideas, that these wo activities
are intensive agriculture and eco-tourism respectively. The eco-tourism produc-
tion function is based on unspoilt land (forests, wetlands, etc.) which carries
biodiversity, whereas agricultural production requires land to be converted into
pasture and arable land with neither local nor global biodiversity value. This
is of course a caricature of reality since tourism can also contribute to destroy
biodiversity when it leads to overcrowding or excessive waste production. If
social utility is de￿ned as a strictly concave separable function of revenue and
biodiversity, then we show that an increase in the country￿ s wealth can either
induce more land conservation -and therefore more biodiversity- or more land
conversion -and therefore less biodiversity- , depending on the relative marginal
productivity of land and capital in the two competing activities3. Therefore
this model provides a renewed interpretation of the Kuznets￿ environmental
curve, based on production economics instead of consumer choice economics.
Although necessarily simplistic, such model echoes the debates taking place
in biodiversity-rich countries on trade-o⁄s between agricultural production and
preservation of their ecosystems. It was calculated in 1995 that the opportunity
costs of biodiversity conservation in Kenya, in terms of net returns forgone from
agriculture, due to parks, forests and reserves, represented 2.8% of GDP and
that the combined revenues from wildlife tourism and forestry were insu¢ cient
2The framework does not fall either in the typology initially established by Hirshleifer
(1983) and Cornes and Sandler (1984) who distinguish the weakest link and the best shot
technologies
3We assume in the rest of the paper that arable land can be returned to its original state.
There are no irreversible change.
4to compensate such losses (Norton-Gri¢ ths and Southey, 1995).
In Section 3, the same result is obtained when the local bene￿ts of land
conservation are a local public good shared between two identical neighbouring
countries, which use it as an input into their tourism production function. The
neutrality of positive income shocks for the two countries is only observed when
there are no substitution nor complementarities e⁄ects between land and capital
in the two activities.
Section 4 then assesses the impact of income transfers from an ecosystem-
poor country (the North) to two ecosystem-rich countries (the South) sharing
a common ecosystem. Warr￿ s neutrality property generally collapses. When
income redistribution induces an increase of biodiversity, we demonstrate that
there are cases for which it is a Pareto-improving policy. Less intuitively, it is
shown that Pareto improving transfers are still possible even when they induce
the south to settle for a lower level of biodiversity. In the current context favour-
ing conditional transfers, that is payments made in proportion to conservation
e⁄orts, this result indicates that lump-sum transfers between countries might
be viewed as policy instruments which are worth investigating since they can
provide the incentives to move forward in the right direction with neither control
nor monitoring costs.
2 Biodiversity and agriculture-tourism trade-o⁄
in a simple one-country model
Consider a southern country endowed with a naturally biodiversity-rich land
(natural pastures, wetlands, forests) supplying a number of ecological services
such as ￿ ood protection or climate regulation and providing amenities which
also essential assets for developing green tourism activities. This land area I;
normalized to unity by an adequate choice of units, is potentially convertible
(ploughing, deforestation, drainage) into arable land for agricultural production.
Let sa denote the surface converted into arable land and let sn denote the
unconverted natural land (also called natural capital). By de￿nition, sn+sa = 1:
The country is also endowed with an exogenous national wealth w; a share
x 2 [0;1] of w can be used as monetary expenditures in tourism, RT; the
remaining part (1￿x) being then used as monetary expenditures in agriculture,
RA. Of course RT + RA = wx + (1 ￿ x)w = w:
The production technology in the touristic sector, ￿ T(sn;RT); requires two
inputs, unspoilt land and monetary investments, whereas the agricultural tech-
nology, ￿ A(sa;RA), combines farmland, which does not carry any valuable bio-
diversity, with money. Both functions are increasing, twice di⁄erentiable and
strictly concave with respect to each of their arguments.
Without loss of generality, units of outputs, in each sector, are chosen so that
unit prices are both equal to one. Therefore the total revenue from production is
simply ￿ T(sn;RT)+ ￿ A(sa;RA): With linear costs, the pro￿ts in the two sectors are
5T(sn;RT) = ￿ T(sn;RT)￿cnsn￿rTRT and A(sa;RA) = ￿ A(sa;RA)￿casa￿rARA,
where cn and ca are the unit costs of natural land and arable land; respectively
rT and rA are the unit opportunity costs of monetary expenditures in tourism
and in agriculture. Then the net total revenue is y = T(sn;RT)+A(sa;RA).. We
shall assume that the costs of inputs are su¢ ciently low, so that T(:) and A(:)
are increasing functions in each of their arguments. Four technical assumptions




@saA(1;RA) > 0; 8RT; RA 2 [0;w];
A2 @
@snT(1;RT) ￿ @
@saA(0;RA) < 0; 8RT; RA 2 [0;w];
A3 @
@RT T(sn;0) ￿ @
@RAA(sa;w) > 0; 8sn; sa 2 [0;1];
A4 @
@RT T(sn;w) ￿ @
@RAA(sa;0) < 0; 8sn; sa 2 [0;1]:
Finally, the country￿ s utility is U(y;sn), a di⁄erentiable function, strictly
increasing in each argument and globally concave. Clearly natural land is both
a consumption good - associated with the biodiversity value of land -, and a
productive input - in the tourism production function.




The ￿rst-order conditions for interior solutions are written:
@U
@sn
= U1(T1 ￿ A1) + U2 = 0 () T1 ￿ A1 = ￿
U2
U1
= ￿MRS ; (1)
@U
@x
= wU1(T2 ￿ A2) = 0 () T2 = A2 ; (2)
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between net revenue and natural
capital, and where U1 = @U
@y and U2 = @U
@sn are the partial derivatives of the
utility function with respect to y and sn respectively, T1 = @T
@sn, T2 = @T
@RT ,
A1 = @A
@sa, A2 = @A
@RA are partial derivatives of the sectoral pro￿t functions
with respect to sn, RT, sa, and RA.
This is a model of optimal allocation of factors between two activities. The
vector of optimal decisions d￿ = (s￿
n;x￿) is reached when the di⁄erence in land
marginal revenue is equal to the marginal rate of substitution (1) and when
marginal revenue of monetary expenditures are equal in the two production
sectors (2).
2.1 Monetary transfers and resources allocation
Let the country￿ s utility function be U(y;sn) = y+"N (sn), with " > 0 a strictly
positive parameter and N (:) a continuous function, increasing and concave with
6respect to sn that converts an area of natural land into a biodiversity index.
For instance, if the biodiversity index is the ￿￿biodiversity, that is the number
of species in the area under conservation, then the functional form is usually
written: N (sn) = bsz
n; with b > 0 and z 2 [0;1]: Note that, with this choice of
utility function, MRS = U2
U1 = "N0:
A monetary transfer to the country (in the form of a lump-sum subsidy
from an international organization, or bilateral aid) increases its wealth w. In
the appendix, we show that it will induce a marginal change in the optimal









[T11 + A11 + "N00][T22 + A22] ￿ [T12 + A12]2 (3)
where A11 = @A1
@sa < 0; A22 = @A2
@Ra < 0; T11 = @T1




@RT are the second order partial derivatives of the net revenue
function.
From expression (3), one can readily deduce the conditions under which a
monetary transfer has no e⁄ect (marginally) on the natural capital. At the most
general level, neutrality is obtained when the numerator is zero, that is:
A12T22 ￿ A22T12 = 0 :
A priori, this general condition encompasses ￿ve subcases: i) A12 = A22 =
0; ii) T22 = T12 = 0; iii) T22 = A22 = 0; iv) A12 = T12 = 0; v) A12T22 =
A22T12 with A12;T22;A22;T12 6= 0: Possibilities i) ￿ iii) are ruled out by the
assumptions of strict concavity made so far on the production technologies. Let
us discuss the two last ones. Possibility iv) depends only on the technologies in
the two sectors, whereas possibility v) is more subtle as it may also depend on
the way resources are re-allocated after a change in w.
Proposition 1 If there are no complementary nor substitution cross e⁄ects
between land and monetary expenditures, i.e. A12 = T12 = 0; then a ￿nancial




This property does not mean that the second decision variable x is unaf-
fected. Actually a change in the initial wealth induces a change in the allocation








xT22 ￿ A22(1 ￿ x)
w(T22 + A22)
: (4)
But, by assumption this has no e⁄ect whatsoever on the marginal revenues T1
and A1; therefore no e⁄ect on the optimal sn as can be deduced from the ￿rst
order condition (1).
Proposition 2 if A12T22 = A22T12 with A12;T22;A22;T12 6= 0, then a ￿nancial




















This second case exists even when A12;T22;A22;T12 6= 0 are not constants.
When those second derivatives vary with the level of natural capital and the
level of monetary investments, Proposition 2 singles out the case where the
monetary transfer induces a reallocation of monetary expenditures such that
the ￿rst order condition T1 ￿ A1 = ￿U2
U1 is veri￿ed at the unchanged optimal
level of natural capital sn (see ￿gure 1):
Incidentally, this situation supposes that the cross partial derivatives have
the same sign: either land and monetary expenditures are complementary in
both sectors, or they are substitutes in both sectors.
Those particular cases excepted, natural capital either increases or decreases
with income. With a slight abuse of language we shall borrow two notions










It is worth interpreting those results in the light of the Kuznets￿environmen-
4The choice of term "normal good" or "inferior good" is partially inexact since sn is not
only a consumption good (in the second part of the utility function) but also an input in the
net revenue functions.
8tal curve hypothesis (KEC). The KEC is an empirical statistical result showing
an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and environmen-
tal degradation. It tends therefore to indicate that beyond a turning point,
economic growth can lead to environmental improvement. The usual intuitive
explanation for this phenomenon is that the pure scale e⁄ect (production growth
leads to an increase in pollution and resource exploitation) is compensated by
improvements in green technologies driven by a higher demand for environ-
mental quality (Stern, 2004). However, the KEC is a controversial result: an
increasing number of econometric studies show that there are no regularities
in the revenue-environment relationship, especially when one looks at resource
depletion rather than pollution concentration (see Koop and Tole, 1999 for a
study on deforestation). Surprisingly, there is relatively little formal modelling
exploring the micro-economic foundations of the KEC, although this could be
very useful to explain the di⁄erent curves observed empirically. Bulte and van
Soest (2001) propose a household model of optimal allocation of work and in-
vestment when natural capital is an input in production, and show that under
the imperfect market hypothesis the U-shaped relation between natural capital
stock and income can be generated.
Our optimal production model provides the theoretical basis for an expla-
nation of the KEC rooted in production economics. We have shown above how
natural capital can decrease or increase with wealth depending on the relative
concavity parameters of our production functions for tourism and agriculture
(A11;A22;A12;T12). The intuition is the following: when agricultural produc-
tion increases, therefore driving up income, the relative marginal productivity of
land and monetary investments in this sector decline, making it more pro￿table
to invest in tourism and protect natural capital. We intend, in a subsequent
version of this paper, to introduce examples of production functions which could
illustrate the KEC and more generally reproduce the results found in Koop and
Tole (1999) in the case of deforestation .
2.2 Monetary transfers and total utility






















































= A2 ￿ 0:
9As the intuition suggests, total utility increases when wealth increases.
3 The local public good dimension of biodiver-
sity in the two-country model
It is often the case that natural capital has in fact cross-border spillovers. For
example, a large forest area, or wetlands, will presumably bene￿t neighbour-
ing countries by preserving wildlife habitats and landscapes and therefore will
increase the attractiveness of the whole region for tourism. Conversely, if a coun-
try chooses to reduce the quality and size of its preserved land, it will probably
harm the whole region as well by reducing ecological services and amenities.
Therefore, in many cases, sn is a regional public good: countries in the same
region bene￿t from it without exclusion nor rivalry in consumption. Examples
abound: lake Victoria in East Africa, the Amazon forest in South America, the
mangroves in South East Asia.
Let us assume that the southern country described in the previous section is
split into two identical sovereign countries sharing a common border (i = 1;2).
Each country has an initial endowment in natural capital Ii = 1=2 and an initial
level of wealth wi = w=2:
Production functions and utility functions are unchanged. Each country i
has to choose the optimal allocation of land (sni) and monetary expenditures
(xi) between the two activities, tourism and agriculture. There are two di⁄er-
ences with the previous basic model. Firstly, sn =
P
sni is a regional public
good. Each country bene￿ts from it both as an input in the tourism production
function and as a consumption good. Secondly and consequently, there are now
strategic interactions.
3.1 Monetary transfers and resource allocation
Non cooperative decisions di = (sni;xi); i = 1;2 are conceptualized as a Nash
equilibrium. Each country selects its contribution sni to the public good/input
and the allocation xi of monetary expenditures between tourism and agriculture
in order to maximize its utility, taking as given the decision variables of the other





￿ yi = T(sni + snj;Ri
T) + A(1
2 ￿ sni;Ri





2w(1￿xi) are the monetary expenditures dedicated
respectively to tourism and agriculture,
￿ and snj and xj are considered as exogenously given.




1(T1 ￿ A1) + Ui












1(T2 ￿ A2) = 0 () T2 = A2:
De￿nition 3 A interior symmetric Nash equilibrium (ISNE) for the two-country






that countries simultaneously solve their decision problems given the decisions
of the other country.
Note that, at such a symmetric outcome, MRS1 = MRS2 = MRS.
For Ui(yi;sn) = yi + "N (sn), we can calculate the impact of a change in




























(2T11 + A11 + 2"N00)(T22 + A22) ￿ (T12 + A12)(2T21 + A21)
(6)
Results are comparable to those found in the ￿rst section. An increase in the
wealth of both countries can either lead to a higher sn or to a lower sn:Under
speci￿c conditions, and in particular when cross e⁄ects of inputs are nil, then a
￿nancial transfer to botyh countries has no impact on total natural capital.
3.2 Monetary transfers and social welfare
Let us consider an utilitarian social welfare function for the two countries con-
sidered together:
W = U1(y1;sn) + U2(y2;sn)






















































































































+ A2 : (10)














+ A2 : (11)





Remember that in an economy with a single country, the utility increases after
a positive shock to income. By contrast, in a two-country world, expression (11)
shows that the variation of each country￿ s utility is ambiguous.
Proposition 4 If dsn
dw
￿ ￿
d=d = 0, i.e. a change in total income produces no




d=d = A2 > 0.
In this case, when one of the two conditions for dsn
dw = 0 is met (cf. sec-
tions 2.1 and 3.1), then an exogenous increase of income always ends up in an
improvement of social welfare, although it has no e⁄ect on the public good pro-
vision. This is due, as in Section 3.1, to an optimal reallocation of investments
between the two economic activities. In all other cases, when dsn
dw 6= 0, the two
following clear-cut properties hold:




Proposition 5 singles out a su¢ cient, easy-to-interpret and empirically testable
condition (normality), for a positive social welfare impact. But the necessary




d=d ￿ 0 i⁄ dsn
dw ￿ ￿A2
T1 .
Therefore there can be Pareto improving transfers even if sn is akin to an
inferior good, provided that dsn
dw < 0 is not too small. To put it di⁄erently, the
variation of social welfare depends on the sign of dsn
dw ; and it depends on its scale
(when dsn
dw < 0).
Finally, it is worthhighlighting that there are cases when monetary transfers
have a negative impact both on the conservation of natural capital and on
welfare: when dsn
dw < ￿A2
T1 < 0 then dW
dw < 0
This is an interesting counterintuitive proposition, suggesting that the taxa-
tion of these countries would help improve their level of welfare and biodiversity.
124 Adding the global public good dimension of
biodiversity
4.1 A simple north-south model
A wetland spreading over two neighbouring countries is a local public good; it
delivers ecological services (water storage, water puri￿cation etc.) bene￿tting
without rivalry to the citizens of both countries. It is also a public input pro-
viding amenities to both countries and therefore entering as an argument in
their tourism production functions. In addition, the preservation of the wet-
land ecosystem contributes to improve the quality of global biodiversity and
generates world-wide bene￿ts. From a general perspective, those global bene￿ts
should be taken into account. Following this idea, we add a northern distant
country in the conceptual framework. This third country does not share the
regional bene￿ts of the wetland because of geographical distance but it shares
the bene￿ts of the gene pool conservation and of its existence value.
Formally, a three-country economy, i = 1;2;3 allows to add to the model
the global public good dimension to the natural capital. This global public
good is denoted: G = G(sn1;sn2;g3) = N(sn) + g(g3) where g3 is the ￿nancial
contribution of the third country to biodiversity (ie monetary contributions
to R&D e⁄orts that convert genetic diversity into pharmaceutical innovations,
which in turn are bene￿cial for public health; funds to ￿nance gene banks etc.)
and g is the production function of global public good associated with expenses
g3..The functions N and g are both continuous, increasing and concave. Note
the heterogeneity of the inputs: in the model, the natural area is localized in the
￿rst two countries; the third countries is not endowed with the natural potential
for conservation, but it can o⁄er ￿nancial contributions to increase the bene￿ts
of biodiversity. We assume that N and g are additive and separable in the
production function of.the global opublic good G:In other words, even if both
southern countries destroyed entirely their natural asset, sn1 = sn2 = 0;the
northern country could still contribute to the global public good, ie through the
￿nancing of ex-situ conservation.
As in the previous section, the focus shall be on the e⁄ect of income transfers
on the Nash equilibrium, therefore on the equilibrium trade-o⁄between the two
activities of tourism and agriculture, with one di⁄erence though: transfers are
not considered as exogenous income shocks anymore; they shall be organized
from the northern country towards southern countries. In other words, we
￿nally explore the question of the impact of income redistribution on the level
of biodiversity and welfare.
As for country 3, its utility reads as U3(c3;G) = v(c3) + ￿G, where v(c3) is
a concave and increasing function of private good consumption c3 = w3 ￿ g3;
and ￿ > 0 represents a preference parameter for the global public good G. This
country has only one decision variable: the level of monetary contribution g3 to
the production of biodiversity. To avoid corner decisions we assume:
A5 ￿v0(w3) + ￿g0(0) > 0;
13A6 ￿v0(0) + ￿g0(w3) < 0:
The utility functions of country i = 1;2 is now Ui(yi;G) = yi+"G: Southern
countries have the same preference for the global public good.
De￿nition 7 A interior symmetric Nash equilibrium (ISNE) for the three-
country economy is a pro￿le of decisions b d = (b sn1;b sn2; b x1; b x2;b g3); such that
countries simultaneously solve their decision problems given the decisions of the
other countries.
More precisely, on a non cooperative basis each country takes as given rival
decisions and uses its own decisions to maximize its utility:




subject to yi = T(sn;Ri
T) + A(I=2 ￿ sni;Ri
A): At an interior Nash equi-
librium for i = 1;2, we have:
T1 ￿ A1 = ￿
U2
U1
= ￿TMS = ￿"N0 (sn) ; (12)
T2 = A2 : (13)




The ￿rst order condition for an interior decision is:
￿U3
1 + U3
2g0 = 0 (14)
It should be noted that this system of ￿ve equations is decomposable into
two independent blocks: the ￿rst one is a system of four equations for four
unknown (sn1;sn2;x1;x2) and the second block is made of a single equation
for g3. By di⁄erentiating the last equation with respect to g3 and w3; we can










According to our assumption of additive separability of utility functions,
U3
12 = U3
21 = 0; and U3



















Expression (15) con￿rms, under particular assumptions, the intuition that
a contribution to a public good increases when income increases. Besides, one
can observe that 0 <
dg3
dw3 < 1 because g00 < 0; U3
11 < 0 and U3
2 > 0: a reduction
of the northern country￿ s income by one dollar is followed by a less than pro-
prtional reduction in the contribution to biodiversity, whereas the private good
consumption is reduced by a greater amountr.
4.2 Welfare e⁄ect of a lump sum transfer between coun-
tries
When welfare is accounted for by the utilitarian criterion
W = U1(y1;G) + U2(y2;G) + U3(c3;G) ;
what is the welfare e⁄ect of a lump sum income redistribution from the North to
the South, given the complex public good nature of biodiversity? Let us study
a transfer from country 3 that is shared equally by country 1 and country 2.




d=b d > 0, i⁄





Despite its complicated form, the above inequality has an easy interpretation:
its right hand side is the welfare impact of the change in the Northern country￿ s
decision variables (g3 and c3) after the transfer. When dw3 < 0, this welfare
impact is negative. The left hand side displays the welfare e⁄ect of a change in
the local trade-o⁄s in southern countries. It is unambiguously positive when the
natural capital is a normal good (that is when dsn
dw > 0). Overall, the expression
reveals the conditions for a global positive welfare e⁄ect: the adjustments in the
south must compensate the negative welfare e⁄ect from the adjustment in the
north. Presumably, it is more likely to be the case when the natural capital is a
normal good. When sn is an inferior good, then a necessary (but not su¢ cient)
condition is that the positive impact on agricultural income of an increase in
wealth exceed the negative impact on welfare of the reduction of sn:
Otherwise, dW
dw < 0, and it would be justi￿ed, from the point of view of
e¢ ciency, to organize transfers from the South to the North! The logic that
explains this possibility is not di¢ cult to grasp, but this is a rather provoca-
tive and hard to admit conclusion. As a mitigation, one should bear in mind
that transfer policies are primarily designed to pursue equity goals rather than
e¢ ciency goals.
There is a simple policy implication from this section: before any income
transfer, an empirical study which should not be limited to an estimation of
15whether sn is an inferior good, would be welcome. Those results suggest that
a precise knowledge of production technologies in sectors destroying or using
biodiversity is valuable if decision-makers wish to use unconditional transfers
as a policy instrument to improve the protection of biodiversity and to increase
global welfare. This knowledge must be su¢ ciently precise about the cross
e⁄ects between land and investments (T12, A12) in production technologioes,
about the extent of decreasing returns (T11, T22, A11, A22) and about the mar-
ginal products (T1, T2, A1, A2). In addition, we have shown that the additivity
of the production technology for the public good is not su¢ cient for the robust-
ness of Warr￿ s neutrality theorem. Indeed, the welfare variation is generally
not null after an income redistribution between the three countries, even if the
redistribution does not change the set of contributors.
4.3 Extensions
Beyond showing how fragile the neutrality property can be in the complex con-
text of biodiversity, the previous results also reveal the important role played
by some sort of complementarity assumptions. This suggests an addendum to
the scope of this paper: we propose to investigate the robustness of a positive
e⁄ect on the protection of biodiversity of an increase in wealth, when there
exists complementarities between the agricultural sector and the tourism sec-
tor. More precisely, the goal of this subsection is to make four jumps in one
shot; namely by decreasing order of importance: i) to allow for non in￿nites-
imal redistributions of income, ii) to dispense with interior decisions, iii) to
allow for any number of countries, both in the north and in the south, iv) to
give up all symmetry assumptions, except for the way income is redistributed
in the south. The ￿rst two limitations come from the use, so far, of the im-
plicit function theorem. But under speci￿c conditions, akin to complementarity
assumptions, supermodularity theory can prove a much more powerful tool to
perform some comparative statics. As we now show, this approach is indeed
fruitful to strengthen our previous results -though not all.
From now on, we drop Inada conditions (A1 to A4). There are now p countries
in the south, and q countries in the north. Previous speci￿c forms for utility
functions are maintained but we allow for heterogeneity (we previously assumed
symmetry in the south). In the south, utility functions are:
Uh(yh;G) = yh + "hG ; h = 1;:::;p:
And, in the north, utility functions are:
Uh(ch;G) = vh(c3) + ￿hG ; h = p + 1;:::;p + q:
The global public good technology is therefore:
G = G(sn1;sn2;:::;snp;gp+1;:::;gp+q) = N(sn) + g(gp+1 + :::: + gp+q):
16As before, the functions N and g are both continuous, increasing and concave.
Each southern country now has speci￿c concave technologies for its two
sectors, Th(sn;Rh
T) and Ah(sah;Rh
A), that may di⁄er from the technologies in




12 > 0; h = 1;:::;p:
A8 Th
11 = N00 = 0:
Those assumptions ensure increasing best reply functions in the south (see
Appendix C). For this reason, we call this particular extended model the par-
tially supermodular north-south model. Intuitively, in such a strategic situation,
a change in southern income fosters the marginal incentives to scale up the share
of natural capital in the total land endowment: indeed, because Ah
12 < 0; the
relative interest to allocate more land to the agricultural sector, compared to
the tourism sector, is reduced. As far as the decision to allocate money be-
tween the two sectors is concerned, concavity in the agricultural sector (Ah
22)
also increases the incentive to invest more in tourism. Finally, because of some
complementarity between the di⁄erent trade o⁄s (Th
12 +Ah
12 > 0), all those par-
tial e⁄ects reinforce each other. We can therefore expect an overall increase of
natural income. This property can indeed be established very simply.
A feasible redistribution of income from the north to the south is a vector
(4w1;:::;4wp;4wp+1;:::;4wp+q) with positive p ￿rst elements and the follow-
ing q elements negative. Of course
p+q X
i=1
4wi = 0 ;
and, in addition, a feasible redistribution is such that it does not put donor
agents into bankruptcy, which means wi + 4wi ￿ 0; i = p + 1;:::;p + q:
Actually, within the set of feasible redistributions, attention is restricted to
those resdistributions o⁄ering the same increments to all the southern coun-
tries: 4w1 = 4w2 = ::: = 4wp = 4w:
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions A7 and A8, in the partially supermodular
north-south model a feasible redistribution of income
(4w;:::;4w;4wp+1;:::;4wp+q)
from the rich north to the developing south has a non negative impact on the
natural capital, hence on biodiversity.
Proof. Appendix C.
5 Conclusion
How do those results compare with those established by Warr ? This author
shows that income transfers between contributors are neutral on the private
17provision of public goods which are produced via an additive technology. When
dealing with biodiversity, a multidimensional public good, we have shown that
the assumption of additive technology does not guaranty the neutrality property.
Indeed, the non neutrality is the rule while neutrality is the exception. Here
the input dimension of the public good plays a key role, as well as its regional
dimension. Furthermore, the nature of the public good biodiversity, i.e. normal
good or inferior good, is helpful in assessing the welfare e⁄ect of marginal income
redistributions. Normality makes a stronger case in favor of lump sum transfers
as a tool for the protection of biodiversity. However, it should be reminded
that Pareto improvements can be obtained without modi￿cation, or even with
a reduction of the level of biodiversity. When both the local dimension and
the global dimension of the public good are considered, the e⁄ects of income
redistribution are complex and their assessment require a good knowledge of
the production technologies for which natural capital is an essential input, since
cases when transfers from the North to the South reduce global welfare cannot
be excluded. Under such conditions, recommandations for Pareto-improving
policies should - in theory - include South-North transfers. This latest ￿nding
converges with Ono￿ s results (1998) when the issue at stake is consumption
externalities. Of course, it should be interpreted with care since such analysis
does not include equity concerns but it could feed the debates on transfers
taking place on various international negotiation arena. Southern biodiversity-
rich countries are increasingly vocal about the ￿nancial aid they wish to obtain
from industrial countries in compensation for their e⁄orts to protect biodiversity.
The like-minded group of megadiverse countries created in 2001 by biodiversity-
rich countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, China, or the Philippines argues in favour
of massive transfers to the South for the preservation of ecosystems. There is
scope, however, to conduct a more careful analysis of the potential impact - on
biodiversity- of such transfers.
However, biodiversity protection is not limited to the North-South issue. The
paper￿ s results are also relevant when dealing with decisions at a federal level.
There are several sites in Europe which are close to the situation described in the
model. For example, the Prespa Lake is one of the largest remaining wetlands
in the Northern part of the Mediterranean Sea. It is located across Macedonia
(candidate to the EU), Albania (candidate to the EU) and Greece (EU mem-
ber) . Prespa Lake and its associated wetlands are an important economic zone
for the three countries both in terms of agricultural production (apple produc-
tion especially) and ranging, ￿shing activities, and in terms of tourism which
increased rapidly since the creation of the Prespa Park in 2000. Prespa Lake is
also listed as a Ramsar site and part of the site is either registered as national
monument or park or Natura 2000 site for bird protection. Despite these protec-
tion zones, Prespa Lake is increasingly threatened by economic development in
the three countries. Indeed, the Prespa Lake, as in our ￿rst model, is at the same
time an input for many of the local activities (agriculture, ￿shing, tourism), a
local public good preserved for local biodiversity and ecological services, and
a global public good as it has been identi￿ed as a site of European interest
(Natura 2000) and international interest (Ramsar Convention) for biodiversity
18conservation. Financial transfers already exist between European countries to
contribute to biodiversity conservation, most of them being conditional. The
theoretical conclusions of our model could provide a ￿rst basis of discussion
at the European Commission level to link redistributive policies amongst EU
members and biodiversity protection.
19Appendix
A Variation of the conservation e⁄ort in an econ-
omy with a single country - Section 2
Starting from the optimal decision vector d￿ = (s￿
n;x￿) and di⁄erentiating the
￿rst order conditions with respect to w, sn and x; it follows:
￿
[xT12 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A12]dw + [T11 + A11 + "N00]dsn + [wT12 + wA12]dx = 0 ;
[xT22 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A22]dw + [T21 + A21]dsn + [wT22 + wA22]dx = 0 :
After dividing each of those expressions by dw, one obtains:
￿
[T11 + A11 + "N00]dsn
dw + [T12 + A12]w dx
dw + [xT12 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A12] = 0
[T21 + A21]dsn
dw + [wT22 + wA22] dx
dw + [xT22 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A22] = 0









[xT22 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A22]
w[T22 + A22]
(16)
Plugging expression (16) into the ￿rst equation of the system, we have:









[T12 + A12][xT22 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A22]
[T22 + A22]
+ [xT12 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A12] = 0
















[T12 + A12][xT22 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A22] ￿ [T22 + A22][xT12 ￿ (1 ￿ x)A12]




[T11 + A11 + "N00][T22 + A22] ￿ [T12 + A12]2
The simpli￿cation of expression (17) is reported in Section 2.1 (expression
(3)).
20B Welfare e⁄ect of a lump sum transfer between
countries
The utilitarian social welfare function is given by:
W = U1(y1;G) + U2(y2;G) + U3(c3;G)









1. dy1 = dy2 = dy = [(T1 ￿ 1
2A1)dsn
dw + 1
2A2]dw (according to expression (8)
of the previous section),
2. dG = N0 @sn




3. dc3 = dw3 ￿
@g3
@dw3dw3 ::


















































































































= [T1 + (3" + 2￿)N0]
dsn
dw
+ A2 ￿ 4"g0(g3)
dg3
dw3
￿ 2v0(c3) : (19)
Equipped with this expression, it is easy to deduce the condition given in Propo-
sition 8.
C E⁄ect on biodiversity of an income transfers
in the partially supermodular north-south model
The idea of the proof is to notice the equivalence between the Nash equilibrium
of the partially supermodular north-south model on the one hand, and the Nash
equilibrium of a ￿ctitious supermodular game on the other hand. Since in the
later an increase of the income pushes upwards the equilibrium (by the proper-
ties of supermodular games), so does the outcome in the partially supermodular
north-south model.
On a non cooperative basis, each country takes as given rival decisions and
uses its own decisions to maximize its utility:
￿ for h = 1;:::;p:
max
sni2[0;Ih];xh2[0;1]
Uh(yh;G(sn1 + ::: + snp;gp+1 + ::: + gp+q))
subject to yi = T(sn;Ri
T) + A(Ih ￿ sni;Ri
A): The necessary ￿rst order



























￿ and for h = p + 1;:::;p + q:
max
gh2[0;wh]
Uh(wh ￿ gh;G(sn1 + ::: + snp;gp+1 + ::: + gp+q))
Again the ￿rst order condition is:







Interestingly enough, the set of necessary conditions for the south, under
our assumptions, does not depend on the decisions variables of the north, and
conversely, the set of necessary conditions for the north does not depend at all
on the decisions undertaken in the south. This property turns out to be crucial
for the simplicity of the proof.
The trick is to observe that necessary conditions (20) and (21) are also






T) + Ah(Ih ￿ sni;w ￿ Ri
T) + "N (sn):














12(Ih ￿ snh;w ￿ Rh
T) > 0 ;
@2
@snh@xk
￿h = 0; k 6= h;
@2
@snh@wh￿h = ￿Ah
12(Ih ￿ snh;w ￿ Rh




22(Ih ￿ sni;w ￿ Rh
T) > 0 :
This means the ￿ctitious game is supermodular. From the properties of such
games, the Nash equilibrium decision variables of the ￿ctitious supermodular
model are non decreasing functions of the parameter w; hence, in the partially
supermodular north-south model, the amounts of land left for nature by south-
ern countries are non decreasing functions of the income increments:
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